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Gooch: Gooch: Message to Criminal Defendants

The Message to Criminal
Defendants-Waive at Your Own Risk: The
Eighth Circuit Enforces Waivers of
Appellate Rights
United States v. Michelsen'
I. INTRODUCTION
"The right to appeal at least once without obtaining prior court approval is
nearly universal. [A]lthough its origins are neither constitutional nor ancient, the
right has become, in a word, sacrosanct., 2 Likewise, the criminal defendant's
right to utilize appellate rights as a bargaining chip meets with widespread
acceptance; nearly every circuit allows criminal defendants
to waive their rights
3
to appeal in conjunction with plea bargain agreements.
The circuits disagree, however, concerning whether a defendant's waiver
of appellate rights remains valid if a district court judge fails to explicitly discuss
the waiver with the defendant during a Rule 11 colloquy 4 and later advises the

1. 141 F.3d 867 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 363 (1998).
2. Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More orLess) Seriously, 95 YALE
L.J. 62, 62 (1985).
3. See United States v. Haliburton, No. 95-1688, 1997 WL 242033, at *1 (6th Cir.
1997) ("Such a waiver provision made in connection with a Rule 11 plea agreement is
enforceable and precludes [defendant's] appeal in this case."); United States v.
Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995) ("A defendant may waive her right
to appeal, if that waiver is the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to forgo the
right to appeal.") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914,
917 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,516 U.S. 970 (1995) ("A defendant may waive the statutory
right to appeal his sentence."); United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1345 (1lth Cir. 1993) ("[S]entence
appeal waivers, made knowingly and voluntarily, are enforceable."); United States v.
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that a defendant may waive constitutional rights as part of a plea bargaining
agreement. It follows that a defendant may also waive statutory rights, including the
right to appeal."); United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[A]
defendant who pleads guilty and expressly waives the statutory right to raise objections
to a sentence may not then seek to appeal the very sentence which itself was part of the
agreement."). But see United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding that a defendant may never knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to appeal
in conjunction with a plea bargain agreement).
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(c) lists matters of which the court must advise the criminal
defendant personally and in open court before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo
contendre from the defendant. Rule 1l(c) does not require that the court engage the
defendant in a discussion concerning the defendant's waiver of appellate rights. See FED.
R. CaiM. P. 11(c). Though Rule 11(c) is the primary colloquy provision, Rule 11(d)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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defendant, without objection from the Government, of the right to appeal.' In

UnitedStates v. Melancon,6 the Fifth Circuit suggested that a Rule 11 colloquy
addressing the defendant's waiver of appellate rights constitutes a necessary
component of an enforceable waiver. The court further ruled that a district court
judge's statement that the defendant may appeal, even if not objected to by the
Government does not invalidate a written waiver of appellate rights.7 In United
States v. Buchanan,8 the Ninth Circuit held that no Rule 11 colloquy is required
for the criminal defendant's waiver of appellate rights to be deemed enforceable,
but that a district court judge's oral pronouncement that the defendant may
appeal, received without objection from the Government, invalidates an
otherwise enforceable waiver. In United States v. One Male Juvenile," the
Fourth Circuit rejected Buchananand adopted Melancon, while suggesting even
more strongly than the Melancon court that a defendant's waiver of appellate
rights will only be declared valid if the district court judge engages the defendant
in an explicit discussion of the waiver during the Rule 11 colloquy."
In United States v. Michelsen, the Eighth Circuit addressed both the Rule
11 colloquy issue and the oral pronouncement issue, siding with the Fifth and
Fourth Circuits in rejecting the Buchanan court's treatment of the oral
pronouncement issue, but embracing Buchanan on the Rule 11 colloquy issue.
The court made clear that criminal defendants will not be freed from validly
executed waivers despite the absence of a Rule 11 colloquy on the waiver and
despite a lower court judge's erroneous pronouncement,
without objection from
3
the Government, that the defendant may appeal.

requires the court to address the defendant personally and in open court to determine that
the plea was voluntarily entered into before accepting the plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
11(d).
5. United States v. One Male Juvenile, No. 96-4023, 1997 WL 381955 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998); Buchanan, 59 F.3d at 914; Melancon, 972
F.2d at 566.
6. 972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992).
7. Id. at 567-68.
8. 59 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 970 (1995).
9. Id. at917-18.
10. No. 96-4023, 1997 WL 381955 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191
(1998).
11. Id. at *2-*4.
12. 141 F.3d 867 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 363 (1998).
13. Id. at 871-72.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/5
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Harry Lee Michelsen, charged with failure to pay past due child support in
violation of the Child Support Recovery Act,' 4 agreed to have his case heard by
a magistrate judge and subsequently entered into a plea bargain agreement with
the Government.' Under the agreement, signed by both Michelsen and his
and expressly waived his right to appeal his
private counsel,' 6 Michelsen clearly
7
conviction and his sentence.'
Specifically, in signing the agreement, Michelsen waived statutory and
Michelsen
constitutional rights to which he was otherwise entitled.' 8

14. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994) (making failure to pay court-ordered child support
punishable by fines and imprisonment).
15. Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 867.
16. Id. at 868.
17.United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir.), cert.denied, 119 S. Ct.
363 (1998). "Michelsen does not dispute that his written plea agreement contains a clear
and express waiver of the right to appeal both his conviction and his sentence." Id.
18. Id. at 867-68. Relevant portions of the plea agreement in question provide as
follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND
1.
UNDERSTANDING OF MAXIMUM PENALTIES: The defendant agrees
that he has been fully advised of his statutory and constitutional rights herein,
and that he has been informed of the charges and allegations against him and
the penalty therefor, and that he understands these rights, charges and
penalties. The defendant further agrees that he understands that by entering
a plea of guilty as set forth hereafter, he will be waiving certain statutory and
constitutional rights to which he is otherwise entitled.
2. PLEA AGREEMENT PROCEDURE-NO RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
PLEA IF COURT REJECTS RECOMMENDATION: The United States and
the defendant agree that this Plea Agreement is presented to the Court
pursuant to Rule I I(e)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provides, among other things, that the government will make a
recommendation or agree not to opposed [sic] the defendant's request for a
particular sentence, but that SUCH RECOMMENDATIONS ARE NOT
BINDING ON THE COURT and that the DEFENDANT MAY NOT
WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY if the Court rejects such
recommendations.
4. Further, the United States will recommend a period of incarceration of 6
months, that the period of incarceration shall be suspended and defendant
placed on supervised probation for a period of 5 years during which period
the defendant shall make any required child support arrearages payments as
ordered by the Court. Failure to make the required payments may result in
imposition of the court's sentence of incarceration....
6. WAIVER OF DEFENSE AND APPEAL RIGHTS: Defendant hereby
waives any right to raise and/or appeal and/or file any post-conviction writs
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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acknowledged that if the magistrate judge chose not to follow Government
recommendations that Michelsen be placed on probation for five years and be
made to pay past due child support payments as ordered by the court pursuant
to the plea agreement, the waiver remained effective.' 9 Michelsen also waived
any right to appeal or bring a defense subsequent to the court's entry of a
judgment against him.20
United States Magistrate Judge Thomas D. Thalken 2l accepted the plea
agreement at a hearing commenced the same day the agreement was executed.22
During the hearing, Judge Thalken asked Michelsen several questions, but
neither the judge nor the prosecutor made explicit reference to the portion of the
plea agreement in which Michelsen waived the right to appeal his conviction and
his sentence.23
The court rejected the Government's recommendation, sentenced Michelsen
to imprisonment for six months, and ordered restitution in the amount of
$89,420.64, plus a special assessment often dollars.24 At the sentencing hearing,
Judge Thalken also explicitly advised Michelsen, without objection from the
Government, that he had ten days after the filing of the judgment to appeal his
sentence.25 In addition, the written judgment explained that the court had
advised Michelsen of his right to appeal.26

of habeas corpus or coram nobis concerning any and all motions, defenses,
probable cause determinations, and objections which defendant has asserted
or could assert to this prosecution and to the Court's entry of judgment
against defendant and imposition of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742
(sentence appeals).
Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 868. The Honorable Thomas D. Thalken serves as a United States
Magistrate Judge for the District of Nebraska.
22. Id. Prior to the sentencing hearing, after his counsel's motion to withdraw was
granted, Michelsen waived his right to counsel and proceeded pro se. Id. at 867-68.
23. Id. at 870.
24. United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 363 (1998).
25. Id. Judge Thalken stated:
Mr. Michelsen, you're advised that you may appeal this sentence within ten
days after the filing of thejudgment in this matter. That will probably happen
within the next day or so. When that is filed you will have ten days to appeal
that sentence to one of the judges of the United States District Court.

Id.
26. Id. The written judgment read as follows:
Following the imposition of sentence, the court advised the defendant of his
right to appeal pursuant to the provisions of FED. R. CRiM. P. 32 and the
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and that such Notice of Appeal must be
filed with the clerk of this court within ten (10) days of this date.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/5
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Michelsen appealed to the district court, challenging the constitutionality
of the Child Support Recovery Act as well as the sentence imposed by the
magistrate judge. 28 The district court granted the Government's motion to
dismiss the appeal with prejudice, ruling that Michelsen waived his appellate
rights under the plea agreement.29 Michelsen then sought relief from the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 3
In a majority opinion3' written by Judge Wollman, the Eighth Circuit
confronted the above-referenced circuit split regarding the validity of a waiver
of a right to appeal executed in conjunction with a plea bargain agreement. The
court held that such waivers remain valid even if the trial judge fails to question
the defendant about the waiver during the Rule 11 colloquy at the sentencing
hearing and even if the trial judge explicitly states, without objection from the
Government, that the defendant may appeal the conviction and sentence.32
IRl. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Plea bargain agreements constitute an integral part of the federal criminal
justice system. 33 Although plea bargain agreements themselves find acceptance
at all levels of the judiciary, the United States Supreme Court has not yet
addressed the question of whether a federal criminal defendant fhay waive his
appellate rights as part of a plea bargain agreement.34 An overwhelming
Id.

27. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
28. United States v. Michelson, 141 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.

Ct. 363 (1998).
29. Id.
30. Id.

31. Id. at 867. Judge Bright filed a dissenting opinion. Id.
32. Id. at 871-72.
33. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (specifically authorizing plea bargain agreements); see

also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (discussing the "mutuality of
advantage" inherent in plea bargains). In Brady, the court noted:
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of
pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious-his exposure

is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical
burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages-the
more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more
effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of
trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases
in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there

is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof.
Id.
34. See Recent Case: CriminalLaw and CriminalProcedure- CriminalLawPleaAgreements-Second Circuit UpholdsPleaProvisionThat Waives Appeal Without
Fixed Sentence Range- United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 1997), 111 HARV.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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majority of federal circuit courts hold that such rights may be waived in
conjunction with a plea agreement.35 Additionally, the American Bar
Association recognizes the validity of express waivers of appellate rights in the
context of plea bargain agreements. 6 The circuit courts recognizing waivers of
the right to appeal uniformly maintain that a criminal defendant must have
executed the waiver "knowingly" and "voluntarily" in order for the waiver to be
deemed valid.37
The question upon which circuit courts have split, and the question at issue
in the instant decision, concerns whether a waiver of appellate rights, knowingly
and voluntarily sacrificed as part of a criminal defendant's plea bargain
agreement, remains valid: (1) when a trial judge fails to engage the criminal
defendant in a Rule 11 colloquy38 regarding the waiver; and (2) when a trial
judge, without objection from the Government, explicitly states that the criminal
defendant's sentence and conviction may be appealed.
Of the three circuits that have addressed the question, two have determined
that such statements by the judge do not affect the validity of an otherwise
knowing and voluntary waiver.39 These same two courts also suggested that a
Rule 11 colloquy would be necessary under such circumstances for the waiver
of appellate rights to be deemed knowing and voluntary.
In United States v. Melancon,40 the Fifth Circuit ruled that a trial judge's
statements regarding the defendant's right to appeal, even if not objected to by
the Government, do not invalidate a knowing and voluntary waiver executed by
a criminal defendant as part of a plea agreement.4 The court also suggested that
a Rule 11 colloquy is a necessary component of a knowing and voluntary
waiver. 42 In United States v. Buchanan,43 the Ninth Circuit reached an opposite
L. REv. 1116 (1998).
35. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
36. See Projecton Standardsfor CriminalJustice, A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING
TO CRiM. APPEALS § 2.2(c). See generallyKristine C. Karnezis, Annotation, Validity and

Effect of CriminalDefendant'sExpress Waiver ofRight to AppealAs PartofNegotiated
Plea Agreement, 89 A.L.R.3d 864 (1997).
37. United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 1998); United States
v. One Male Juvenile, No. 96-4023, 1997 WL 381955 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1191 (1998) (waiver must be "knowing" and "intelligent"); United States v.
Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1995) (waiver must be "knowing" and
"intelligent"); United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 970 (1995); United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Melancon, 972
F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992) (waiver must be "informed" and "voluntary").
38. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
39. See One Male Juvenile, 1997 WL 381955 at *1; Melancon, 972 F.2d at 566.
40. 972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992).
41. Id. at 568.
42. Id.
43. 59 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 970 (1995).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/5
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conclusion, holding that the district judge's pronouncements concerning the
defendant's right to appeal control despite a knowing and voluntary waiver of
those rights by the defendant in a plea bargain agreement. 44 The Ninth Circuit
also held that a Rule 11 colloquy is not required for a waiver to be knowing and
voluntary. 4 In the final case of the trilogy, UnitedStates v. One Male Juvenile,"
the Fourth Circuit explicitly declined to adopt Buchanan, ruling instead that a
district judge's statements concerning the defendant's right to appeal, even if not
objected to by the Government, do not invalidate a knowing, voluntary waiver
of appellate rights executed in conjunction with a plea bargain agreement.47 Like
Melancon, One Male Juvenile suggests that a waiver will only be upheld as
knowing and voluntary if an explicit discussion of the waiver occurs during the
Rule 11 colloquy.
In Melancon,the criminal defendant, pursuant to a plea agreement, waived
his appellate
rights and pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute MDMA or
"ecstasy." ' On appeal, Melancon argued that the Fifth Circuit should invalidate
his waiver of appellate rights because the waiver was neither knowing nor
informed due to the trial judge's statements at the sentencing hearing, received
without objection from the Government, that the defendant had the right to
appeal his conviction and sentence.50

The Fifth Circuit summarily rejected Melancon's argument that his plea
agreement was uninformed.5 1 The court found that the Rule 11 colloquy
between the judge and the defendant concerning the defendant's waiver of the
right to appeal made the waiver informed.52 The court also held that Melancon's
waiver of the right to appeal was knowing, despite the district court judge's

44. Id. at 917-18.
45. Id. at 916-917.
46. No. 96-4023, 1997 WL 381955 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191
(1998).
47. Id. at *4.
48. Id.
49. United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. During the portion of the Rule 11 colloquy concerning the defendant's
waiver of appellate rights, the court stated:
[Y]ou understand that paragraph six of this and this is very important that you
knowingly, that means you know what you are doing, and by reasoning, have
exercised the choice to intelligently and voluntarily would waive the right to
*appeal the sentence imposed in this case on any ground, including the right
of appeal conferred by Title 18, United States Code, section 3742, in
exchange for the concessions made by the United States of America in this
agreement, do you understand that?
Id. The defendant replied: "Yes, sir." Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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"misstatement" at the sentencing hearing that Melancon had the right to appeal
his sentence and conviction.53 The court stated:
The court's statements ... were made four months after Appellant
entered into the plea agreement with the Government; they could not
have influenced Appellant's decision to plead guilty. [A]ny alleged
uncertainty on behalf of the district court as to the legality of the
agreement does not affect our determination that Appellant's waiver
was knowing, voluntary, and permissible.'
Although the Fifth Circuit left unanswered the question of whether a Rule
11 colloquy regarding the defendant's waiver of appellate rights must occur for
such a waiver to be enforceable, the court's emphasis on the adequacy of the
Rule 11 colloquy between Melancon and the district court judge suggests that the
court viewed the Rule 11 colloquy as a necessary factor in its determination that
the waiver was informed, knowing, voluntary, and ultimately, enforceable.
Thus, while the Melancon court refused to invalidate the defendant's waiver of
appellate rights, the court left open the question of whether an insufficient or
nonexistent Rule 11 colloquy, coupled with a misstatement by the judge, would
render a waiver of appellate rights uninformed, unknowing, and therefore,
unenforceable.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit addressed Melancon's argument that the
Government abandoned its right to enforce the waiver when it failed to object

to the judge's statements that Melancon could appeal his conviction and
sentence. 55 The court noted that the Government's failure to object, "though not
commendable," was not itself sufficient to make the waiver invalid.56 The court
held that in timely notifying the court of Melancon's waiver contained in the plea
agreement, the Government retained its right to enforce the agreement.57
Three years later, in 1995, the Ninth Circuit faced the same issues in United
States v. Buchanan,8 taking a stance in conflict with the Fifth Circuit's approach
in Melancon. The Ninth Circuit held that while a Rule 11 colloquy specifically
addressing the defendant's waiver of appellate rights is not necessary for a
waiver of such rights to be deemed knowing and voluntary, an otherwise
knowing and voluntary waiver becomes unenforceable when the district judge,
without objection from the Government, advises the defendant that he may
appeal his conviction and sentence. 59
53. Id. at 568. In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit did not provide the lower court's
statement to Melancon concerning Melancon's right to appeal.
54. United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 59 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 970 (1995).
59. Id. at 917-18.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/5
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Buchanan, charged with mail fraud and failure to appear, entered into a plea
agreement waiving the right to appeal his sentence, provided the sentence was
within the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines.6 At the plea hearing,
the prosecutor read the entire agreement out loud in open court, and the district
court judge asked Buchanan whether he understood the plea agreement.6' At a
later sentencing hearing, Buchanan moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing
that his counsel failed to advise him of unfavorable provisions in the agreement,
such as the portion of the agreement that barred arguments for downward
departures from the sentencing guidelines.62 During this discussion, the district
court judge told Buchanan that he "could appeal the sentencing findings."'63
Buchanan's sentencing was delayed, the plea agreement was modified to permit
both parties to argue for a departure from the sentencing guidelines, and
Buchanan then reappeared for sentencing on a later date.' At the second
sentencing hearing, the district judge explicitly stated to Buchanan, without
objection from the Government, that Buchanan had the right to appeal his
sentence.65
Unlike the Melancon court, the court in Buchanan directly addressed the
question of whether a Rule 11 colloquy concerning the defendant's waiver of
appellate rights must be conducted in order for the defendant's waiver of those
rights to be declared valid. 6 Whereas the Fifth Circuit in Melancon strongly
suggested that a Rule 11 colloquy addressing the defendant's waiver is required,
the Ninth Circuit adopted the contrary position that "[tlhe district court need not
warn a defendant specifically that he has waived his right to appeal his sentence
during [ ] a [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11 colloquy.., so long as the
record indicates a knowing and voluntary waiver." 67 The court stated that the

district court judge's questions regarding Buchanan's understanding of the plea,
coupled with the prosecutor's recitation of the plea agreement out loud in open

60. Id. at916.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Buchanan, 56 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
970 (1995).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 916, 918. At the second sentencing hearing, the district court judge and

Buchanan engaged in the following exchange:
THE COURT: "I want to advise you as well that under the provisions of Rule
32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [sic] you have the right to
appeal findings which I make today regarding sentencing. To do that, you
must file that notice of appeal within ten (10) days of this date. Do you
understand that?" THE DEFENDANT: "Yes, sir."
Id. at 917.
66. Id. at 917 n.2.
67. Id. (citing United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 38 F.3d 394, 395-96 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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court, fulfilled the requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of appellate
rights, even though Buchanan was never specifically questioned about the
waiver.68
Despite the court's acknowledgment that Buchanan's waiver of appellate
rights was knowing and voluntary, the court69 nonetheless refused to enforce the
waiver, holding that the judge's "oral pronouncement must control."70 More
specifically, the court stated that "where there is a direct conflict between a trial
judge's unambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment,
the oral pronouncement must control, even if erroneous.'
The court noted that the district court twice told Buchanan that he had a
right to appeal his sentence. 72 Additionally, according to the court, "Buchanan's
answer of 'Yes, sir' to the district court's question of whether he understood that
he had a right to appeal indicate[d] Buchanan's expectation that he could appeal
his sentence and evince[d] a misunderstanding of the substance of his plea
agreement."'73 Finally, the court noted that because the Government failed to
object to the judge's statements regarding Buchanan's right to appeal,
"Buchanan could have [had] no reason but to believe that the court's advice on
the right to appeal was correct. '
The Buchanan court appears to have implemented a three-part test for
determining when waivers of appellate rights, knowingly and voluntarily
executed, will nevertheless be held unenforceable. The court stated: "Given the
district court judge's clear statements at sentencing, the defendant's assertion of
understanding, and the prosecution's failure to object,.., the district court's oral
75
pronouncement controls and the plea agreement waiver is not enforceable."
Based on the reasoning in Buchanan, whenever a district court judge states that
a defendant may appeal, the defendant responds to this statement with a simple

68. United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
970 (1995).
69. Circuit Judge Reinhardt filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, in which he
stated that he concurred with the court's findings in regard to the portion of the opinion
relevant to this Note. Id. at 920.
70. Id. at 917.
71. Id. The court referred to UnitedStates v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253 (9th
Cir. 1974). In Munoz-Dela Rosa, the district court judge, in conflict with the written
judgment, incorrectly informed the defendant that his federal sentence would run
concurrently with an earlier sentence imposed by a magistrate judge. Id. The written
judgment stated that the sentences were to run consecutively, not concurrently. Id. at
254.
72. United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 917 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S.
970 (1995). At both the first and second hearings, the court told Buchanan that he had
a right to appeal. Id.
73. Id. at 917-18.
74. Id. at918.
75. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/5
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"yes" or "no," and the Government fails to object, the defendant's waiver of
appellate rights has been voided.
Finally, unlike the court in Melancon, the Buchanan court offered a policy
justification for its holding. The court stated simply that "[l]itigants need to be
able to trust the oral pronouncements of district court judges. 76
More recently, the Fourth Circuit, in UnitedStates v. One Male Juvenile,77
confronted the issues addressed by the Melancon and Buchanan courts. A
majority of the court held that a knowing and intelligent waiver confirmed
during a Rule 11 colloquy remains enforceable, despite a district court judge's
statements, received without objection from the Government, that the defendant
may appeal.78
In One MaleJuvenile,the defendant waived his right to appeal pursuant to
a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to two counts of stealing property
valued in excess of one hundred dollars from an Indian tribal organization in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1163. 79 The One Male Juvenile court was not required
to determine whether a Rule 11 colloquy addressing the defendant's waiver of
appellate rights must occur for such a waiver to be enforceable because, as was
the case in Melancon, the district court judge clearly addressed the waiver of

appellate rights in his colloquy with the defendant, and the defendant affirmed

that he understood the implications of the waiver.80 However, the Fourth Circuit,
like the court in Melancon, strongly suggested that a Rule 11 colloquy
concerning the defendant's waiver of appellate rights constitutes a requirement
of an enforceable waiver." In its holding, the court made special mention of the
Rule 11 colloquy, noting that "[o]nce a defendant has knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to appeal and that waiver is confirmed during a
Rule 11 hearing, the requirements for an effective waiver of appeal have been
satisfied, and the waiver should be enforced. 8 2 In fact, the court stated that a
contrary holding would ignore "the purpose and implication of a Rule 11
hearing. '83

76. Id. In United States v.Schuman, 127 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth
Circuit appears to have distanced itself from its Buchanan policy justification. See infra
notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
77. No. 96-4023, 1997 WL 381955 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191
(1998).
78. Id. at *4.Circuit Judge Mumaghan dissented, specifically disagreeing with
the rule adopted by the majority, and arguing that Buchanan should have been followed.
Id. at *5-*6. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at*1.
80. Id.

81. Id. at *4.
82. United States v. One Male Juvenile, No. 96-4023, 1997 WL 381955, at *4 (4th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998).
83. Id.
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The court next considered whether the district court judge's statement at the
sentencing hearing regarding the defendant's right to appeal rendered the
defendant's waiver of appellate rights unenforceable.' The court, without
addressing the Government's failure to object, expressly refused to adopt the
Ninth Circuit rule."5 The court noted:
We are not persuaded by the holding in Buchanan that a waiver of a
right to appeal contained in a plea agreement that has been entered
knowingly and intelligently may be held unenforceable because of
subsequent erroneous and apparently inadvertent statements by the
district court to the effect that the defendant has a right to appeal. 86
Essentially, the One Male Juvenile court adopted an oral pronouncement rule
nearly identical to the one set out in Melancon. Additionally, like the Fifth
Circuit in Melancon, the Fourth Circuit merely suggested, without definitively
explaining, that a Rule 11 colloquy addressing the defendant's waiver of the
right to appeal must occur in order for such a waiver to be upheld.
A strong dissent accompanied the rule set out in One Male Juvenile. The
dissent embraced the rule and policy justifications set forth by the Ninth Circuit
in Buchanan.7 Circuit Judge Murnaghan, in his dissenting opinion, focused on
the wide-ranging implications of the majority's rule. Thejudge stated that "this
case is not about one district court judge's inadvertence during the sentencing of
[the defendant], rather, this case is about whether the brunt of a district court's
mistakes, coupled with the complicity of the prosecution who never alerted the
district court to its error, should be borne by a criminal defendant." 8 Citing with
approval the Buchanan court's policy that litigants should be able to trust the
oral pronouncements of judges, Judge Mumaghan concluded, "Here, two
important constituent parts of our criminal justice system, the federal district
court and the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), failed [One Male
Juvenile]." 9
The decision in Buchanan created a clear circuit split concerning whether
a criminal defendant who waives his appellate rights knowingly and voluntarily
in a plea agreement may nonetheless appeal when a district court judge, without
objection from the Government, explicitly advises the criminal defendant of a

84. Id. at *2-*4. The district court judge told the defendant that .'[he] ha[d] an
absolute right to appeal [his] sentence.' When asked whether he understood that light,
appellant responded, 'yes."' Id. at *2.
85. Id. at *4.
86. Id.

87. United States v. One Male Juvenile, No. 96-4023, 1997 WL 381955, *5-*6
(4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1191 (1998). See supra notes 66-76 and
accompanying text.
88. Id. at *6.
89. Id.
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right to appeal. The Buchanan decision also created an implicit split regarding
whether a judge must specifically question the criminal defendant about the
waiver of appellate rights in the Rule 11 colloquy in order for the waiver to be
deemed knowing and voluntary, and thus enforceable. Whereas the courts in
both Melancon and One Male Juvenile strongly suggested that such a discussion
during the Rule 11 colloquy constitutes a requisite element of a knowing and
voluntary waiver of appellate rights, the court in Buchanan embraced a contrary
view, flatly declaring that a district court judge need not engage the defendant
in a discussion of the defendant's waiver of appellate rights in a Rule 11
colloquy in order for the waiver to be upheld as knowing and voluntary.
In 1998, the Eighth Circuit confronted similar factual circumstances,
weighing in with both its view on the Rule 11 colloquy issue and on the validity
of a criminal defendant's waiver of appellate rights in a plea agreement in light
of a district court judge's oral pronouncements, with no objection from the
Government, that the defendant may appeal.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In United States v. Michelsen," the Eighth Circuit addressed the two
questions upon which the Fifth, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits disagreed. The
majority held that no explicit discussion of the waiver need occur during the
Rule 11 colloquy and that a judge's erroneous oral pronouncement that the
defendant may appeal, received without objection from the Government, does
not invalidate the defendant's waiver of appellate rights.9' In effect, the Eighth

Circuit adopted the Buchanan court's view on the Rule 11 colloquy issue, while
adopting the Melancon and One Male Juvenile courts' views on the oral
pronouncement issue.
The court first addressed Michelsen's argument that his waiver could not

be considered knowing and voluntary because the magistrate judge did not
specifically discuss Michelsen's waiver of appellate rights during the Rule 11
colloquy.92 The court rejected Michelsen's contention, noting that while "it

90. 141 F.3d 867 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 363 (1998).
91. Id. at 871-72.
92. Id. at 871. The court first noted that Michelsen did not dispute that his plea
agreement contained a clear and express waiver of his appellate rights. Id. The court
also noted that Michelsen did not dispute any of the following: that he signed the
agreement; that he was represented by competent counsel at the time he entered the plea
agreement; that he understood the plea provisions, "including the clear, bold-faced
waiver of appellate rights;" that he was not incapacitated or incompetent at the time; and
that he was physically and mentally capable of comprehending the agreement and
knowingly assenting to its terms. Id. Additionally, the court noted that Michelsen did
not allege that his privately retained counsel was ineffective; that he was misled as to the
nature of the agreement; that he was c6erced into entering the agreement; or that the plea
agreement resulted from duress. Id. Michelsen also argued that the waiver should not
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might have been preferable" for the lower court judge to engage Michelsen in
an explicit discussion of his waiver of appellate rights, such a discussion "is not
a prerequisite for a valid waiver of the right to appeal."" a The court ruled that,
based on the circumstances of Michelsen's
case, his waiver of appellate rights
94
was both knowing and voluntary.
Next, the court discussed Michelsen's argument that the magistrate judge's
oral and written statements indicating that Michelsen could appeal negated his
prior waiver of appellate rights." The court "decline[d] to adopt the reasoning
of Buchanan," instead citing Melancon and noting that "[a]ny statement made
by the court at the sentencing hearing could not have affected Michelsen's
decision, made nearly three months earlier, to plead guilty and waive his
appellate rights." 96 The court deemed "irrelevant" Michelsen's "apparent later
belief... that he might be allowed to escape from his commitments."97
The court looked to Melancon in addressing the consequence of the
Government's failure to object to the judge's oral statement regarding
Michelsen's right to appeal. 9' The court stated that while "the government might
well have clarified the issue by speaking up, a formal objection to the statement
was not dictated by the circumstances." 99 The court also upheld Michelsen's

be enforced because the sentence imposed by the magistrate judge varied from the
sentence recommendation in the plea agreement Id. The court summarily dismissed this
argument as meritless. Id. at 873. Since this argument has no bearing on the circuit split
at issue, this argument will not be discussed in the text of the Note.
93. Id. at 871.
94. Id. at 872. The court stated:
Michelsen, who turned fifty shortly after his sentencing, is a competent,
articulate high school graduate with military service, managerial experience
in the private sector, and prior experience in the criminal justice system. His
attorney of choice negotiated the agreement to which Michelsen gave his
assent. Michelsen and his attorney possessed a copy of the signed agreement
at the plea hearing. Michelsen's statements at the hearing indicate that he
fully understood the finality of his decision to plead guilty and that the
agreement was in complete accordance with his prior understanding; that it
was, in fact, the bargain to which he had agreed. In light of these
circumstances, we conclude that Michelsen's decision to waive his appellate
rights was knowing and voluntary.
Id.
95. United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 363 (1998).
96. Id. The court referenced its decision in Lindnerv. Wyrick, 644 F.2d 724, 728
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 872 (1981) (holding that the voluntariness of a plea
agreement should be determined by looking to the circumstances at the time the
agreement was executed).
97. Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 872.
98. Id. at 872 n.4.
99. Id.
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waiver on the grounds that Michelsen was not prejudiced by the Government's
failure to object."

Finally, the court advanced an argument in support of the waiver raised in
neither Melancon nor One Male Juvenile. The court noted that the judge's oral
statement regarding Michelsen's right to appeal was not completely in conflict
with Michelsen's waiver because even though Michelsen waived his appellate
rights, he implicitly retained the right to appeal on the grounds that his sentence
was illegal or imposed in violation of the plea agreement.'
The court
concluded that "[b]y informing Michelsen of the statutory right to file an appeal,
the court was simply complying with its duty to do so. '' "02

The court devoted the rest of its opinion to considering the policy
arguments supporting its ruling.0
The court determined that criminal
defendants would be best served by being given the option of choosing, as part
of a plea agreement, to forsake certain rights, such as appellate rights, in
exchange for something they would value more highly, such as a reduced
sentence recommendation from the Govemment.0 4 However, according to the
court, "[e]mpty promises are worthless promises," and plea bargain agreements
only retain their value for both the criminal defendant and the Government if
properly enforced. 10 5 Specifically, such waivers benefit the Government only if
the Government can rely upon the waivers being enforced."° If the Government
refuses to allow criminal defendants to waive appellate rights, then criminal
defendants suffer because they lose one of their most valuable bargaining chips
in the plea bargaining process-the waiver of appellate rights. 7
In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Bright rejected the majority rule
based on the facts of Michelsen's case and the Ninth Circuit's policy discussion
in Buchanan.1°' Judge Bright would have invalidated Michelsen's waiver based
on a number of factors.' 9 First, the judge noted that because severe epilepsy and
asthma rendered Michelsen unable to work, Michelsen arrived at court with no

100. United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 872 n.4 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 363 (1998).

101. Id. at 872.
102. Id.

103. Id. at 873.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.

Ct. 363 (1998) (quoting United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 936 (1995)).
106. Id.
107. Id. But see Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS

CONST. L.Q. 127, 192-94 (rejecting the bargaining chip argument and contending that,
even if true, the argument does not justify waivers of appellate rights).
108. Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 874-75 (Bright, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id.
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assets and many medical bills."0 Judge Bright stated that, based on Michelsen's
ill health and his inability to make the child support payments at issue, "it would
seem that neither Michelsen nor the prosecution anticipated that Michelsen
would actually serve time in prison.'
Second, Judge Bright argued that the
magistrate judge's two references at the sentencing hearing to Michelsen's right
to appeal did not constitute "slips of the tongue or misstatements."' 2 Rather,
because the magistrate judge saw Michelsen's ill financial and physical health
and recognized that Michelsen had no knowledge of his probation officer's
unfavorable report,"' the magistrate judge intended that Michelsen be given the
right to appeal based on his atypical circumstances."' Third and finally, Judge
Bright would have deemed the waiver unenforceable based on the Ninth
Circuit's policy justification in Buchanan that criminal defendants need to be
able to rely on the statements of district court judges." 5
V. COMMENT

In Michelsen, the Eighth Circuit adopted a rule that can be easily applied
and is supported by compelling policy interests. The alternative rule adopted in
Buchanan, while supported by a strong policy argument, unreasonably requires
appellate courts to draw conclusions from matters outside the record and fosters
judicial imprecision.
The Buchanan rule, advocated by Judge Bright in his dissenting opinion in
Michelsen, expects appellate courts to draw inferences about a criminal
defendant's understanding of the proceedings below, despite the fact that the
record generally gives appellate courts no grounds for making any determination
as to a defendant's thoughts and feelings during the lower court action. Thus,

110. United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 874 (8th Cir.),'cert.denied, 119 S.
Ct. 363 (1998).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 875.

113. Id. at 874. Judge Bright noted that the magistrate judge, in rendering
Michelsen's sentence, may have been influenced by Michelsen's probation officer's
recommendation that Michelsen be given the maximum sentence, a recommendation
which the magistrate judge did not disclose to Michelsen. Id. The judge noted that
disclosure of the probation report is discretionary under FED. R. CRIM. P. 32, but that,
under the same rule, a judge must usually grant the defendant and the defendant's
counsel an opportunity to comment on information upon which the sentence is based.
Id. Judge Bright noted that because Michelsen appeared pro se at the sentencing hearing,
he "did not have an attorney ... to protect his rights." Id.
114. Id. at 875. Judge Bright stated: "I believe the magistrate judge, by his oral
direction, and the prosecutor, by failing to object, recognized that the defendant should
have the right to an appeal in this unusual case." Id.
115. United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 875 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 363 (1998).
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in Buchanan, a criminal defendant's rote response of "Yes, sir" to one of the
district court judge's many questions earns him freedom from his waiver
because, according to the Ninth Circuit, such a statement "indicates [the
defendant's] expectation that he could appeal his sentence and evinces a
misunderstanding of the substance of his plea agreement."'" 6 Worse yet,
requiring appellate courts to speculate about a defendant's thoughts and feelings
in the prior proceeding can lead to wide-scale guessing games. For example, in
his Michelsen dissent, Judge Bright conjectured about the motivations behind
both the prosecutor's and the magistrate's actions during Michelsen's sentencing
hearing." 7 While it is entirely possible that Judge Bright and the Ninth Circuit
reached correct conclusions through guessing, appellate court judges should not
be forced to adhere to a rule requiring such speculation because too much
potential for misinterpretation and other error exists.
Furthermore, a rule allowing a judge's oral statement regarding the right to
appeal to trump a defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of appellate rights
fosters judicial imprecision. If in fact a judge believes that exceptional
circumstances render a defendant's waiver of appellate rights invalid, the judge
should clearly and explicitly state this belief on the record."8 By allowing a
judge's vague statement to trump Buchanan's written waiver of his right to
appeal, the Buchanan court lowered the bar for judges throughout the Ninth
Circuit. While the Buchanan court's primary policy consideration that
"[l]itigants need to be able to trust the oral pronouncements of district court
judges" 9 unquestionably constitutes an important policy objective, ensuring that
a competent, knowledgeable, and thoughtful judiciary exists constitutes an
equally, if not more, important policy consideration. In giving the defendant in
Buchananthe benefit of the doubt regarding the district court judges statements
advising the defendant of his right to appeal, the Ninth Circuit wasted a valuable
opportunity to address the critical issue in the case and the source from which the

116. United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914,918 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,516 U.S.
970 (1995).
117. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
118. See United States v. Schuman, 127 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1997). In Schuman, a
district court judge from the Ninth Circuit, understandably confused about how to handle
the waiver situation in light of Buchanan, informed the defendant that he had a right to
appeal, and the prosecutor promptly objected to this statement. Id. at 817. Instead of
leaving the Ninth Circuit to guess at his motivations in advising the defendant of his right
to appeal, the district judge clearly and explicitly stated: "I don't know whether under
these circumstances whether his right of appeal has been lost or not. I'm making a
finding it's up to the Ninth Circuit... It's up to the Ninth Circuit to decide whether
under the circumstances he's lost his right of appeal." Id. When the district court judge
clearly and explicitly states his purpose in advising the defendant of appellate rights, the
appellate court, at least, must no longer guess as to whether the lower court judge
misspoke or fully intended to say what he said.
119. Buchanan, 59 F.3d at 918.
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appeal stemmed-the district court judge's lack of clarity. The Ninth Circuit
should have issued a statement explaining that if a district judge belieVes that a
waiver needs to be declared invalid due to special circumstances, the judge
should state this belief on the record. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit should
have advised district court judges of how to inform defendants of the appellate
rights they retain without making statements that render a previously executed
waiver invalid in the event that the prosecutor fails to object.2
Most telling about the soundness of the rules and policies advocated by

Michelsen and Buchanan is the direction subsequent courts have taken in
confronting similar issues. In United States v. Schuman,' the Ninth Circuit
distanced itself from the Buchanan holding.n Nowhere in Schuman does the
Ninth Circuit reference its policy interest in ensuring that litigants are able to rely
on the statements of district court judges. Schuman suggests that once the
Government objects to the judge's erroneous statement that the defendant has a
right to appeal, the policy in favor of allowing defendants to rely on the
statements of district court judges disappears.

In contrast, the rules and policy interests set out in Michelsen have been
embraced and further developed by at least one other circuit.n Additionally, the

120. See Schuman, 127 F.3d at 818-19. The concurring judge attempted to explain

how district court judges should handle the appellate waiver issue in their address to
defendants. Id.

121. 127 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 1997).
122. Id. at 817. In Schuman, the court held that the judge's statement that the
defendant could appeal did not invalidate the defendant's waiver of appellate rights
because the government promptly objected and because, after the objection, the judge
stated that he was sending the issue to the Ninth Circuit because he was unsure whether
the defendant had waived his right to appeal. Id. The court stated that unlike Buchanan,
who "'could have no reason but to believe that the court's advice on the right to appeal
was correct,' Schuman was made aware by both the court and the prosecutor's objection
that the waiver of his right to appeal could preclude an appeal." Id. (quoting United
States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 970 (1995)).
123. In United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1998), the
Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that based on Buchanan, his knowing
and voluntary waiver was nonetheless invalid because the district court judge, without
objection from the State, informed him that he could appeal. Id. The Tenth Circuit
distinguished Buchanan, but went on to state that "even if this case was comparable to
Buchanan, we would not reach the same result." Id. at 1301. While explicitly
recognizing the policy advanced by the Buchanan court, the Tenth Circuit, citing both
Michelsen and Melancon, stated that it was:
more persuaded by the circuits that have held statements made by a judge
during sentencing concerning the right to appeal do not act to negate written
waivers of that right, because statements like those made by the court during
Mr. Atterberry's sentencing do not affect a defendant's prior decision to plead
guilty and waive appellate rights.
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Eighth Circuit has shown no signs
that it plans to retreat from the rules and
24
policies outlined in Michelsen.1
Finally, just as the Michelsen rule concerning the oral pronouncement issue
is both easy to understand and apply, the Michelsen rule regarding the Rule 11
colloquy issue is similarly clear and easily applied. The rule also serves to
ensure that a criminal defendant may not bootstrap his way into the appellate
courts by virtue of the lower court judge failing to mention the words "waiver"
and "right to appeal" during the Rule 11 colloquy. While the Michelsen court
made clear that the district court judge would be well-advised to explicitly
discuss the defendant's waiver during the Rule 11 colloquy, the court refused to
bind itself to a rule declaring that a waiver cannot be knowing and voluntary in
the absence of such a discussion during the colloquy."z From reading the
opinion, district court judges should be able to easily understand the procedures
they must follow during future Rule 11 colloquies, without fear that if they once
inadvertently fail to discuss the waiver during the colloquy, the appellate court
will free the criminal defendant from the strictures of the plea agreement and the
waiver of appellate rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
In UnitedStates v. Michelsen, the Eighth Circuit addressed a split in the
circuits concerning the enforceability of a defendant's knowing and voluntary
written waiver of the right to appeal executed in conjunction with a plea bargain
agreement. The court held that such a waiver remains valid even if not
specifically addressed during the Rule 11 colloquy and even if the lower court
judge, without objection from the Government erroneously informs the criminal
defendant that appeal may be taken. In sum, the Eighth Circuit made clear that
it will not tolerate criminal defendants attempting to sidestep their valid waivers
of appellate rights on a technicality.

GINGER K. GOOCH

124. See United States v. Brown, 148 F.3d 1003, 1012 (8th Cir. 1998).
125. United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 363 (1998).
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